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The Gains from Privatization in Transition Economies:
Is “Change of Ownership” Enough?
CLIFFORD ZINNES,YAIR EILAT, and JEFFREY SACHS*
This paper seeks to clarify what factors contributed to the macroeconomic gains
and losses from privatization in transition economies over the past decade. In
contrast to the original “Washington Consensus,” which had a tendency to equate
change-of-title with privatization, we find that economic performance gains come
only from “deep” privatization, that is, when change-of-title reforms occur once
key institutional and “agency”-related reforms have exceeded certain threshold
levels. We also find that as a result of different initial conditions the economic
performance responses of countries to the same policies are different. [JEL: G38,
L33, O11, P31, and P37]
T
his paper is the third in a series1 that evaluates the first decade of economic
reform in transition economies. Based on indicators developed in Sachs,
Zinnes, and Eilat (2000a), the present paper contributes to the already large
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1The other two are Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat (2000a), which develops an initial conditions typology of
countries in transition and creates indicators for gauging progress in reforms and performance over the
transition period, and Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001), which benchmarks competitiveness of transition
countries in the years 1997–98.literature on transition by seeking to clarify what factors contributed, at the macro
level, to the gains from privatization in transition economies over the past decade.
In doing so, our goal is to point the way to a revised paradigm for privatization
policy in transition economies.
We first summarize the paradigm debate and show how the issues of privatiza-
tion play a central role. We find, as reflected in the original “Washington
Consensus,” that there has been a tendency to equate change-of-title with privatiza-
tion, with the consequence of change-of-title becoming the policy imperative. Based
on a review of the literature on the gains from privatization, however, we identify
the importance of additional factors. These include institutions to address agency
issues, hardening of budget constraints, market competition, and depolitization of
firm objectives, as well as developing institutions and a regulatory framework to
support them. In this paper we examine the empirical evidence across 24 countries
to determine whether change-of-title alone has been sufficient to achieve economic
performance gains or whether these other prerequisites found in the literature
(which we refer to as “OBCA” reforms, see definition in Section II) are important.
We then introduce two key elements of our approach. These are the impor-
tance of initial conditions for economic performance and the significance of the
transformational cycle of transition. For our econometric analysis below, we then
introduce several indicators, which we developed in Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat
(2000a), to capture the degree of change-of-title, agency-related issues, the
progress in other reforms, and alternative measures of economic performance.
We then proceed to examine econometrically the central concerns of the paper.
We first show that privatization involving change-of-title alone is not enough to
generate economic performance improvements. This result is robust to several
alternative measures of economic performance that we utilize, including GDP
recovery, foreign direct investment, and exports. We then introduce our OBCA
indicator to capture the reforms directed at prudential regulation, corporate gover-
nance, hardening of enterprise budget constraints, and management objectives. We
show that, while this measure on its own contributes to economic performance
improvements, the real gains to privatization come from complementing
(combining) change-of-title reforms with OBCA reforms. As Pistor (1999) under-
scores, it is only when the legal and regulatory institutions supporting ownership
are in place and functioning that owners can exercise their prerogatives conferred
by a change-of-title to pressure firms to improve their productivity and prof-
itability. Only then will the economic performance of the country improve.
We  can quantify this result in the following way: the higher the level of
OBCA, the more positive the economic performance impact from an increase in
change-of-title privatization. In particular, where change-of-title has a positive
impact, the impact will be even more positive the higher is the level of OBCA;
where change-of-title has a negative impact, the impact will be less negative the
higher is the level of OBCA. A corollary to this result is that there is a threshold
level of OBCA for change-of-title privatization to have a positive  economic
performance response. Thus, if complementary OBCA reforms are not sufficiently
developed, change-of-title privatization may have a negative performance impact.
An explanation for the cases of worsening overall economic performance from












>change-of-title privatization is that transfer of ownership without the institutional
structures in place for owners to exercise their authority simply replaces poor
government control of management with weak or no private-sector control. The
paper indicates the countries and years that did not exceed these thresholds. This
result also suggests that one size (policy) does not fit all; privatization policies
must be tailored to the level of complementary reforms in place.
We close by cautioning that our results are hardly definitive. While we have
made every effort to use the latest and best data—including a 25-country survey2
especially conducted for this purpose—the amount of structural change occurring
is enormous, the number of observations too few, and the data still too noisy to
claim unconditional success. In addition, we believe that research at the macro
level can be seen only as a supplement, not a substitute, to research at the firm
level. Nevertheless, given that the results are in line with those predicted by
agency theory and given that we have utilized a number of alternative economic
performance measures and a variety of econometric specifications, we feel that
future investigations will broadly support our central conclusions.
I. A Paradigm in Flux
It has not been unusual historically, during a time of major economic crisis,
for policymakers to base key and often radical actions in a region upon a set of
tenets. Sometimes the exact nature and underlying assumptions of the tenets are
not even clear until well after the chaotic events. The twentieth century had its
share of examples, including Lenin’s “New Economic Program,” Roosevelt’s
“New Deal,” and the Marshall Plan for Europe.
It is fair to say that the first decade of transition to a market economy also has
been based on a series of tenets or, as we shall refer to them here, a “paradigm.”
So well known did this paradigm become that it is often referred to as the
“Washington Consensus” since it became the mantra of the donor community
centered around Washington, D.C. Since a description and analysis of this
consensus may be found elsewhere (Williamson, 1990, 1993, 1997; Kolodko
1998; Aziz and Wescott, 1997), we only summarily mention that its key tenets
included fast privatization, immediate macrostabilization, quick liberalization and
sustaining of financial discipline, and opening of the economy to foreign trade and
investment.
In the realm of privatization, we may identify a further set of assumptions
underlying the paradigm. First and foremost was the idea that the linchpin of tran-
sition was to transfer ownership of the firms in the economic sectors to private
hands—and to do so as fast as possible. Once in private hands, a series of self-
reinforcing, virtuous, though self-interested, forces would emerge to demand the
creation of all the institutions required for private ownership, thereby locking in
the market economy. Moreover, the new shareholder class would demand corpo-
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2While this survey (see Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat, 2000a) includes Albania, we have dropped it from
the analysis in the present paper owing to lack of data for a number of key variables.rate governance regulation to insure their ability to exert oversight on enterprise
managers.
These tenets led to a debate of greater and greater vehemence over the past
decade (Balcerowicz, 1993; Nellis, 1999; Dabrowski, 1996; Stiglitz, 1998), even
while the obsessions with macro stabilization, privatization, and structural adjust-
ment have given way to a fourth ingredient: systemic transformation
(Åslund,1994; Kornai, 1994; Sachs, 1996).
Now that a decade has passed, enough data has become available to examine
these concerns. In particular, this paper asks whether privatization has led to better
economic performance, and what are the preconditions necessary for privatization
to generate gains in economic performance. A common though implicit thread
underlying these questions is the degree to which supporting institutions are
necessary in order to achieve the full gains from privatization (Pistor, 2001). Such
institutions might include, inter alia, those responsible for shareholder protection,
banking adequacy, creditor protection and bankruptcy courts, capital market
supervision, and commercial code enforcement. In the present paper, we focus on
the supporting role institutions have in bringing out the full potential of privatiza-
tion. We argue that policymakers should pursue “deep privatization”—that is, both
change-of-title reform and a strengthening of supporting institutions.
II. The Theory of the Gains from Privatization
With excellent surveys already available (e.g., Havrylyshyn and McGettigan,
1998; Sheshinski and López-Calva, 1999), we only highlight here those aspects
pertinent to the motivation of our theoretical framework. We start by discussing
the relevant theoretical literature and then move on to review the empirical
evidence.
A principal reason for privatization has been the existence of information
asymmetries and incomplete contracting problems, leading to severe incentive
problems and therefore serious efficiency losses from public ownership. This
incentive-efficiency link has been called the “agency” problem and, within the
context of privatization, has two threads. The managerial view (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1990) concerns the inability of the state to monitor enterprise managers.
This inability stems from the lack of a market to price and instill discipline on
firms through the threat of takeover or bankruptcy. The political view (Shapiro and
Willig, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1996) concerns the temptation of polit-
ical interference to distort manager objectives away from profit maximization and
toward others such as employment maximization. Moreover, this interference can
also result in the perception among firm managers of a “soft” budget constraint
(Kornai, 1986), in which they expect ex post subsidies or writeoffs to cover enter-
prise losses due to production inefficiencies.
What the agency view points out is that the gains from change of ownership
(referred to below as change-of-title) will likely depend on how a country’s legal,
regulatory, and institutional environment addresses agency-related issues. For the
purposes of the empirical work below, we classify these issues into three types.
The first relates to the firm’s objective (O) function and how closely it reflects
THE GAINS FROM PRIVATIZATION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
149profit maximization. The second relates to the hardness of the firm’s budget
constraint (BC). The third relates to the legal and institutional framework through
which firm owners are able to monitor and control enterprise managers, the so-
called principal-agent (A) problem. For simplicity we combine the letters in paren-
theses to name this class of issues OBCA.
On the issue of the implementation of privatization, Havrylyshyn and
McGettigan (1998) identify two schools of thought. The first school of thought
stresses the importance of the competitive environment and market structure over
ownership (Nellis, 1999). For transition economies, the creation of a competitive
environment would occur through the hardening of enterprise budget constraints
rather than a rush into privatization. This was thought to occur, according to
Frydman and others (1997), as a result of pressures from macroeconomic stabi-
lization on firms to restructure or go out of business. The second school of thought
stresses the need for a headlong rush into privatization, though the need to even-
tually follow up with the development of supporting institutions is sometimes
noted. Both these views underscore the insights from the preceding discussion
regarding the importance of the hardness of the firms’ budget constraints, as well
as the likely importance of establishing a multitude of market institutions.
Much of the empirical literature on the impact of privatization on economic
performance was inspired by Boardman and Vining (1989) and Megginson, Nash,
and Van Randenburgh (1994) whose work is in the nontransition country context.
This literature is of two types: case studies of a small sample of firms (Earle,
Frydman, and Rapaczynski, 1993) and cross-industry econometric studies, either
country-specific (Barberis and others, 1996) or multicountry (Frydman and others,
1998; Pohl and others, 1997). Based on either firm-level surveys or data on
publicly traded firms, these studies are essentially microeconomic in nature and
primarily analyze the effects on labor productivity, level of employment, enter-
prise revenues, and sometimes even profitability. These studies find privatization
to have positive effects across these measures.3 With the exception of Claessens
and Djankov (1998),4 this literature does not examine econometrically the contri-
bution of the legal or institutional regime to enterprise performance.
While these studies are quite revealing, they can only provide a partial picture,
mainly because even the largest of them covers only seven countries. There are
currently over two dozen transition economies, but none of these papers deals with
both Central and Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. Part of
the reason for this is the high cost of firm survey data collection in so many coun-
tries. Even where such firm-specific data exist they are hard to analyze, since little
uniformity or consensus exists regarding the way to define, classify, collect, or
treat such data, especially in the case of transition.
A natural, if imperfect, alternative to complement the firm-level studies would
be to consider macroeconomic econometric evidence of gains from privatization.
Turning first, however, to the macroeconomic theory literature on the subject, we
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3 See Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1998) for a summary.
4 Controlling for institutional differences, they test several propositions of Shleifer and Vishny (1994)
regarding how privatization and stabilization affect firm behavior.find that literature is much less developed (Blanchard, 1997) than on the micro-
economic side. Still the literature carries two implications for our work.
First, it suggests that gains from privatization at the level of macroeconomic
performance depend on complementary policies, and not just those related to
appropriate institutions, as we described above (Aziz and Wescott, 1997). While
privatization means the ending of subsidies, which drain state finances, privatiza-
tion also means the state will lose its share of enterprise profits unless comple-
mentary reforms create an adequate tax code and administration. The potential for
efficiency gains from privatization requires price and wage liberalization in order
to create a price system that reflects economic scarcity. Finally, unless privatiza-
tion is accompanied by reforms to liberalize the current and capital accounts, the
newly privatized domestic firms may not be able to gain access to foreign skills,
markets, and financing necessary for their success.
Second, privatization may have opposite short-term and long-term economic
performance impacts (Aghion and Blanchard, 1993; Roland, 1994). For example,
unemployment may increase over and above what would be expected from the
resource reallocation associated with enterprise restructuring suggested by the
microeconomic perspective. This may occur if privatization leads to employment
shedding as managers are freed from political interference and return to profit
maximization as their principal objective.
A healthy macroeconomic empirical literature does exist on the determinants
of transition paths (de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1995; Fischer, Sahay, and Végh,
1996; Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden, 1998), often with real GDP growth
as an explanatory variable. Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999), however, indicate
that little macroeconomic econometric evidence exists on the effects of privatiza-
tion. It is precisely this gap that we aim to redress in the present paper. For this
purpose, we make use of the indicators created in Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat
(2000a). The indicator approach is predicated on the assumption that economic
concepts can be captured—especially when data are poor or intermittent—by
aggregating several imperfectly reported data series, in order to “put the law of
large numbers to work.”5
III. Data and Empirical Approach
The first element of our framework is the use of an initial conditions cluster
typology. As explained in Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat (2000a), we assign countries to
groups based on similarities in variables at the start of transition. These variables
represent various aspects that may be relevant for a country’s prospects of transi-
tion performance.6 The clustering exercise resulted in seven clusters of transition
countries, as listed in Table 1.
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5See Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001) for a discussion of the indicator approach.
6For this purpose, we used a computer program that assigns countries to clusters in a way that mini-
mizes intracluster differences and maximizes inter-cluster differences according to a chosen list of vari-
ables. The categories of initial condition variables we used include physical geography, macroeconomics,
demographics and health, trade and trade orientation, infrastructure, industrialization, wealth, human
capital, market memory, physical capital, culture, and political situation.The cluster approach, by considering groups of countries based on their initial
conditions, permits a more controlled basis for comparing “successful” and
“failed” policies implemented during transition. By using cluster-fixed effects we
can analyze within-cluster differences and thereby assess policy effectiveness.7 A
second element of our approach is acknowledging that the important factor in the
time domain is the elapsed time since transition and not calendar time. Our hypoth-
esis, which we base on Sachs (1996) and Kornai (1994), is that each country,
regardless of the actual calendar date, passed through a sequence of recessions,
typically first from macrostabilization and then from restructuring. We capture
these in our regressions through the use of transition year dummy variables for each
year of transition.8 We also use dummy variables to take explicit account of the
effects of macrostabilization on economic performance (Sachs, 1997).
In this work we take advantage of a unique panel dataset of indicators for the
period 1990–98 developed in Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat (2000a).9 The dataset
includes a series of indicators representing the components of the depth of privati-
zation and progress in transition. These indicators were constructed using two types
of sources. We first used virtually all published data sources available at the time
for which substantial country coverage existed for the transition countries. Second,
we developed and administered a 100-question survey to research institutes in all
25 transition countries. The goal of the survey was to augment published sources
with data sources not reported by international collection agencies.
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7An alternative approach to control for initial conditions is to explicitly include initial condition vari-
ables in the regression. See, for example, de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1995), who use principal compo-
nents analysis to cluster (i.e., reduce the number of) variables rather than countries.
8Year of beginning of transition: 1990: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia; 1991: Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia; 1992: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan.
The values of these dummies are available from the authors. Our analysis shows that most of the
cluster and transition year dummies are statistically significantly different from one another, providing
support for their inclusion in the regressions. See Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat (2000b) for a detailed discus-
sion of the methodology and interpretation of results.
9All indicators are scaled to have a mean of zero and a variance of unity across the 25 countries and
years 1990–98 of transition.
Table 1. Summary of the Initial Conditions–Based Typology
Cluster Name (Number)* Country Membership
EU border states (1) Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
The Balkans (2) Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania
The Baltics (3) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Albania (4) Albania
Western FSU (5) Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine
Caucasus (6) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
Central Asia (7) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
*Figures 1 and 2 use these numbers to refer to the clusters.To  capture the depth of privatization, we follow the theoretical framework
presented above and break “depth” into two major components. The first we call
change-of-title. This indicator consists of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) large-scale and small-scale privatization indices, the
private sector share of GDP, the percentage of state firms privatized, and the
private sector share of employment. The second we call OBCA (see above) which
aims to capture the firm management objectives, the hardness of its budget
constraint and the quality of corporate governance, and shareholder protection
regulation. The indicator consists of the share of tax arrears in GDP, the ratio of
budget subsidies to average GDP over the period, the share of bad loans to total
loans, the electricity tariff collection ratio, the likelihood of a government bailout
of a midsized private-sector firm, the existence of bankruptcy courts, and the
EBRD restructuring and legal system indices. Figures 1 and 2 present the progress
in change-of-title and OBCA over the transition cycle averaged by cluster (see
Table 1) as well as the scores of the different countries in 1998. The Appendix
provides the “recipes” used for constructing these variables.
In addition to the change-of-title and OBCA indicators, we also developed an
aggregate reform indicator (REF) of the other reforms under way. We use REF as
a control to ensure that our privatization variables do not proxy for other reforms.
REF comprises several components. The social safety net component captures
several aspects of the government’s attempt to soften the negative social impacts
of transition. The price liberalization component comprises goods and services
prices, as well as wages and the degree of competition in the price formation
process. The capital markets component comprises subindicators for the stock
market, securities market, and the nonbank financial institutions. The tax reform
component includes improvements not just in the tax code but also in its adminis-
tration. The banking sector component focuses on the degree of competition in the
sector and the degree to which the sector is providing economic agents with
adequate credit and services. Finally, the land reform component concentrates on
measuring the degree that land markets function in a way consistent with the needs
of a market economy.
For measuring economywide, macroeconomic performance, we have chosen
four measures. These include real GDP per capita, foreign direct investment (FDI)
per capita, FDI per unit GDP in 1989, and exports per unit GDP in 1989. We now
look at these measures in more detail.
The first economic performance measure, IGDP, describes domestic output.
Using GDP growth rates from EBRD (1999, p. 73), we construct an index of real
GDP relative to 1989 (so that the value for each country is 100 in 1989). The index
therefore indicates the degree of economic recovery by showing the percent of
pretransition output attained in a given year. This approach facilitates the compar-
ison of performance across countries with vastly different initial per capita
figures.10 We also test the logarithmic transformation of this variable (LogIGDP)
as a dependent variable.
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10This approach differs from other papers in the literature—for example, de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb
(1995); Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998); and Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1996), who use the
annual growth rate of real gross domestic product as a dependent variable and not growth since 1989.Clifford Zinnes,Yair Eilat,and Jeffrey Sachs
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1.  EU Border States 2.  The Balkans 3.  The Baltics
Figure 1.  Inter- and Intra-Cluster Variation of COT Indicator of Privatization  
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Source: Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat (2000a).
Notes: Upper panel: Year transition began: 1990: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland Romania, 
Slovakia. 1991: Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia. 1992: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. Data Exclusions: Macedonia was excluded from the Balkans for the figure above due to lack of 
data on COT. EU border is missing transition year 9 since observations for Croatia and Slovenia are missing. 
Lower panel: Symbols: Hollow square: average of the cluster for 1998. Horizontal line: average of the entire 
sample for 1998. Country codes: ALB—Aalbania, ARM—Armenia, AZE—Azerbaijan, BGR—Bulgaria, 
BLR—Belarus, CZE—Czech Republic, EST—Estonia, GEO—Georgia, HUN—Hungary, HRV—Croatia, 
KAZ—Kazakhstan, KGZ—Kyrgyz Republic, LAV—Latvia, LTU—Lithuania, MDA—Moldova, 
MKD—Macedonia, POL—Poland, ROM—Romania, RUS—Russia, SVK—Slovakia, SVN—Slovenia, 
TJK—Tajikistan, TKM—Turkmenistan, UKR—Ukraine, UZB—Uzbekistan. Cluster numbers: See Table 1.  
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6.  The Caucasus
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1.  EU Border States 2.  The Balkans 3.  The Baltics
Figure 2.  Inter- and Intra-cluster Variation of OBCA (Firm Incentive) Indicator  
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Source: Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat (2000a).
Notes:  Upper panel: Year transition began: 1990: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland Romania, 
Slovakia. 1991: Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia. 1992: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Data 
Exclusions: EU border is missing transition year 9 since observations for Croatia and Slovenia are missing. The 
Balkans are missing transition years 1 and 9 since Macedonia gained independence only in its second year of 
transition. Lower panel: Symbols: Hollow square: average of the cluster for 1998. Horizontal line: average of the 
entire sample for 1998. Country codes: ALB—Albania, ARM—Armenia, AZE—Azerbaijan, BGR—Bulgaria, 
BLR—Belarus, CZE—Czech Republic, EST—Estonia, GEO—Georgia, HUN—Hungary, HRV—Croatia, 
KAZ—Kazakhstan, KGZ—Kyrgyz Republic, LAV—Latvia, LTU—Lithuania, MDA—Moldova, 
MKD—Macedonia, POL—Poland, ROM—Romania, RUS—Russia, SVK—Slovakia, SVN—Slovenia, 
TJK—Tajikistan, TKM—Turkmenistan, UKR—Ukraine, UZB—Uzbekistan. Cluster numbers: See Table 1.  
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HUNThe second economic performance measure is an indicator of foreign revealed
preference on the quality of a country’s environment for economic activity. Here
we construct two related measures. The first, FDIpop, is constructed by dividing
foreign direct investment by total population, both from EBRD (1999). The
second, FDIrel, has the same numerator but uses pretransition GDP in 1989 at
purchasing power parity (from de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1995) as the denomi-
nator. We deflate by population and by 1989 GDP to provide two perspectives on
what might be comparable indicators of foreign investor activity across countries.
In the FDIpop regressions we include INCpc89 (de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb’s per
capita income in 1989 at purchasing power parity) as an additional explanatory
variable to reflect the fact that higher income countries generally attract more
foreign direct investment.
The last economic performance measure, EXPrel, refers to exports (as
reported by the balance of payments statistics) and proxies a country’s interna-
tional competitiveness. This has been deflated by GDP in 1989 (again, de Melo,
Denizer, and Gelb, 1995). In these regressions we use LogPOP (log of population)
to capture the fact that small countries are more export intensive than big
countries.
While each of these performance measures is a highly imperfect measure of a
country’s true economic performance, our hope is that taken together, they provide
a more realistic window into what is actually happening in these countries.
IV. Is “Change of Title” Enough?
Perhaps the most straightforward test of the Washington Consensus—that
change-of-title per se yields economic performance gains—is to place change-of-
title (COT) in regressions with performance measures as dependent variables.
Consider the equation:
PERFi,t = g1 COTi,t + g2 COTi,t–1 + g3 REFi,t
+ ∑k[g4kCLUST(k)i] + ∑j[g5jTrYEAR(j)i,t] 
+ ∑m[g6mSTAB(m)i,t ] + gzZ i,t + γi,t ,( 1 )
where the i and t subscripts are for country and year, respectively, the g parame-
ters are to be estimated, and γi,t is the regression’s error term. PERF stands for our
five performance measures described in Section III, namely, IGDP, LogIGDP,
FDIpop, FDIrel, and EXPrel. REF measures other reforms. The k, j, and m are
summation indexes over six clusters, eight transition periods, and three macrosta-
bilization periods, respectively. CLUST(k)i are dummy variables for each of the
clusters. For example, CLUST(k)i is equal to one if country i belongs to cluster k
and it is zero otherwise. These capture our beliefs about the importance of initial
conditions. TrYEAR(j)i,t are dummy variables for years since the start of transi-
tion. For example, TrYEAR(j)i,t is equal to one if t is the jth year of transition for
country i, and it is zero otherwise. These capture our belief that systemic trans-
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countries to follow an adjustment process linked to the years since transition
began. STAB(m)i,t comprises three dummy variables that capture the impact of
macrostabilization. STAB(1)i,t is one for country i during the first two years of
macrostabilization and it is zero before and after; STAB(2)i,t is one for years three
through five after macrostabilization and zero before and after; STAB(3)i,t is one
for the sixth year and beyond of macrostabilization and zero otherwise.11 Z repre-
sents other variables we use as controls, as described in the previous section.
Table 2 provides estimates of the regressions for the alternative specifications
implied by equation (1) for the panel of 24 countries from the start of transition
through 1998. Regardless of performance measure used, the results are similar.
We find that the level of reforms contributes to recovery and performance across
most specifications, though this effect is somewhat muted once stabilization
dummies are included in the regression.12 The main result here, however, is a
negative one: change-of-title does not seem to have a significant impact. This
suggests that change-of-title alone is not enough to generate economic perfor-
mance gains.13
V. Complementary Reforms to Deepen Privatization Gains
Given the tenor of the paradigm debate as described at the start of this paper, the
results of the previous regressions may come as no surprise. The literature suggests
institutions, in the broad sense, as the leading candidates for the missing elements.
These include those institutions related to prudential, regulatory, and budgetary
authorities. For this reason and as described in the introduction, we created our
OBCA variable to capture the firm’s management objective, corporate governance,
shareholder protection, and the hardness of the firm’s budget constraint.
To test the importance-of-institutions hypothesis, we add OBCA to equation
(1) to get
PERFi,t = f1 COTi,t + f2 OBCA i,t + f3 REF + ... + γi,t , (2)
where, as before, PERF refers to each of the five performance measures and the
“...” refers to Z and the dummy variables CLUST(k), TrYear( j ), and STAB(m). The
fs denote parameters to be estimated.
Table 3 provides the regression estimates for alternative specifications of
equation (2). Two conclusions can be inferred from these regressions. First,
regardless of the performance measure, the introduction of OBCA does not change
the fundamental result that change-of-title has little effect on achieving privatiza-
tion gains. Second, for most specifications, OBCA has a weak positive effect on
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11An alternative is to use log of inflation as a proxy for macro stabilization (see Fischer, Sahay, and
Végh, 1996).
12When we decompose the reform indicators into its components, we find that capital market devel-
opment has the strongest positive effect on performance.
13Though not reported here, these results do not change when we replace contemporaneous COT by







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.generating performance gains from privatization. These results suggest that while
the effect of OBCA alone on economic performance is supportive, we should look
further to substantiate its theoretical importance. Though not reported here, these
results do not change when we replace contemporaneous COT and OBCA by COT
and OBCA lagged by one or two years.
Note that these results do not imply that privatization, “deep” or otherwise,
has little impact on economic performance. Rather, they indicate that change of
title or agency-related regulations each taken on its own has at best a limited effect
on economic performance. What we want to check to test the “new paradigm” is
whether economic performance gains require simultaneous improvements in both
COT and OBCA. We refer to such a simultaneous improvement as the “deep priva-
tization” effect.
We can examine what other policy reforms deepen privatization impacts on
economic performance by adding an interaction term to our model as follows:
PERFi,t = h1 COTi,t + h2 OBCA i,t + h3 REFi,t 
+ h4 COTi,t* OBCA i,t + . . . + γi,t ,( 3 )
where, as before, PERF refers to each of the five performance measures and the
“. . .” refers to Z and the dummy variables CLUST(k), TrYear(j), and STAB(m). The
hs denote parameters to be estimated.
Table 4 presents the estimation results of alternative specifications of equation
(3). The strongest conclusion of these regressions is the powerful role of OBCA in
support of COT economic performance improvements. This synergistic effect is
captured in the COT*OBCA interaction term, which is significantly positive across
all regression specifications. To check the robustness of this result we repeated the
regressions for various specifications and methods. These include using random
effects and OLS models, inclusion of other quadratic terms (i.e., COT squared,
OBCA squared, and COT multiplied by REF), dividing the sample into subsamples
by period and by geography, and replacing the cluster dummies by country
dummies and the transition year dummies by calendar year dummies. The results
of these exercises for the case where IGDP is used as the performance measure are
shown in Table 5. A similar exercise was done using our other performance
measures and did not yield significantly different results. We also verify that these
results do not change when we replace contemporaneous COT,  OBCA, and
COT*OBCA by one- or two-year-lagged COT, OBCA, and COT*OBCA. In all
these cases the coefficient on COT*OBCA remains very significantly positive.14
The interpretation of this strong result is that the higher the OBCA level a
country has, the more positive is the impact of an increase in change-of-title on
economic performance. That is, if the change-of-title impact is positive, it will be
even stronger when OBCA is higher, and if the change-of-title impact is negative,
Clifford Zinnes,Yair Eilat,and Jeffrey Sachs
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14 It is especially interesting to see that in the regressions where more than one quadratic term is
included, not only does COT*OBCA maintain its significance, but the other quadratic terms do not prove













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.it will be less negative. This latter case, where the effect of a change-of-title
increase is negative, can be explained by the fact that transfer of ownership
without the institutional structures in place for owners to exercise their authority
simply replaces poor government control of management with weak or no private
sector control.
To understand these effects, we differentiate equation (3) with respect to COT:
dPERFi,t / dCOTi,t = h1 + h4 OBCAi,t .( 4 )
The above equation shows that if h4 is positive, the higher is OBCA, and the larger
is the effect of a change in COT on performance. This equation also allows us to
determine the level of OBCA needed to generate a positive performance effect of
an increase in change-of-title.
Similarly, to determine the level of change-of-title needed to generate a posi-
tive performance effect of an increase in OBCA, we differentiate equation (3) with
respect to OBCA:
dPERFi,t / dOBCAi,t = h2 + h4 COTi,t.( 5 )
Note that by construction the sample mean (across all countries and years) of
OBCA and COT is zero. Consequently, in equation (4), since the coefficient on
COT (h1) is not significantly different from zero, an average level of OBCA is not
enough to ensure COT has a positive economic performance gain. In equation (5)
for the case of OBCA, however, since the coefficient of OBCA (h2) is statistically
significant and positive, an average level of COT is enough to ensure OBCA has a
positive economic performance gain.
To be more precise about the effect of change-of-title on performance, we can
use direct statistical tests to determine the critical levels of OBCA above (below)
which an increase in COT guarantees a positive (negative) effect on performance.
We  do this by performing one-sided F-tests using the coefficients estimated in
regression a of Table 4. To find the upper (lower) critical value, we search for the
minimum (maximum) value of OBCA for which the null hypothesis that
dPERF/dCOT in equation (4) is smaller (greater) than zero can be rejected for a
chosen confidence level. We then repeat this exercise using dPERF/dOBCA in
equation (5) to determine the critical levels of COT for which OBCA has a signif-
icant impact on performance.
The results of these tests for confidence levels of 90 and 95 percent in the case
when the dependent variable is IGDP are shown in Figure 3. As an example, at the
10-percent significance level, for any country with a level of OBCA below –1.0
(i.e., one standard deviation below the sample mean across all countries and
years), any change-of-title increase will cause a loss in economic performance.
Similarly, at the 5-percent significance level, for any country with a level of
OBCA above 0.5, any change-of-title increase will cause a gain in economic
performance.
While only indicative, it is interesting to inquire what countries fall into these
ranges. Table 6 shows what countries fall into the 95-percent confidence level for
Clifford Zinnes,Yair Eilat,and Jeffrey Sachs
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the exception of Bulgaria since 1997 (and Armenia for just 1997), only the EU
border states and the Baltics have high enough levels of OBCA so that increases
in change-of-title are likely to generate economic performance improvements.
On the other hand, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic in 1990,
no countries in the EU border states or the Baltics appear to have had OBCA levels
so low such that there would be a likely loss in their economic performance from
a change-of-title increase.
While we do not present here an analogous table for changes in OBCA, one
should nonetheless note that no country in our sample had a change-of-title level
low enough to generate negative performance impacts from an increase in OBCA,
even at the 90-percent confidence level. That is, OBCA may not always generate
improved performance in the short run, but it has not proven to do any harm.
VI. Policy Implications
The analysis in this paper supports some recommendations for policymakers.
First and foremost, they should consider carefully when recommending quick
privatization if the requisite OBCA-related, legal, and regulatory institutions are
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Figure 3.  Values of OBCA (COT) Required for an Increase in COT (OBCA) to  

























Source: Author's estimates, using one-sided F-test for coefficients estimated in regression a on Table 1.not sufficiently developed and functioning. Our analysis suggests that countries in
the western FSU do not meet these conditions (with the Caucasus and Central Asia
borderline). Economic performance gains come only from “deep” privatization,
that is, where change-of-title reforms occur in the presence of high enough levels
of OBCA. Moreover, as a result of their different initial conditions, the economic
performance responses of countries to the same policies are different. In the area
of privatization, these responses depend on the level of complementary reforms
and on OBCA-related reforms in particular. Thus, a corollary of our analysis is
that, in the case of transition countries, one size (policy) does not fit all. Policy
prescriptions, therefore, should be less ideological and more tailored to the
country’s institutional conditions and stage of transition. While ownership matters,
institutions matter just as much.
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Table 6.Years in which OBCA Levels Would Have Caused a COT Increase
to Lead to a Gain (Loss) in IGDP , at 95 Percent Confidence Level
Country Years of  Years of Country Years of  Years of 
IGDP gain  IGDP loss IGDP gain IGDP loss
Armenia 1997 Through 1994 Lithuania Through 1993, Never
Since 1996
Azerbaijan Never 1992 Macedonia Never Never
Belarus Never Since 1997 Moldova Never Never
Bulgaria Since 1997 Never Poland Since 1994 Never
Croatia Since 1996 Never Romania 1998 Through 1991
Czech Rep. Since 1994 1990 Russia Never 1996–97
Estonia All years Never Slovakia Since 1994 Never
Georgia Never Through 1994 Slovenia Since 1994 Never
Hungary Since 1994 Never Tajikistan Never Through 1995
Kazakhstan Never 1994 Turkmenistan Never Never
Kyrgyz Rep. Never Never Ukraine Never Through 1994
Latvia 1993, since 1996 Never Uzbekistan Never Never
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